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Abstract
Hypothetical bias is the gap between the hypothetical willingness
to pay and the real economic payment. Subjects may overstate or
understate their willingness to pay due to strategic behaviour. This
bias is common in contingent valuation studies. In this study, we
attempt to use a commitment device to correct the bias, in order
to elicit sincere preferences. We use a solemn oath in second-price
auctions, using both induced valuations and homegrown valuations.
Using a random effect panel data model, we draw three conclusions:
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(1) there is a gap between subjects’ bids and their true willingness
to pay due to the violation of both the budget constraint and the
participation constraint; (2) oaths in the induced value experiment
can increase subjects’ bids towards the induced value only given real
monetary incentives; (3) oaths can modestly correct the hypothetical
bias in the homegrown valuation experiment.
Keywords: Preference elicitation, Oath, Second-price auction, Induced-
value experiment, Homegrown valuation
JEL Classification: C90, Q51, D44
“A promise is a promise. Lieutenant Dan.” Forrest Gump (1994)
1 Introduction
Eliciting sincere preferences for environmental goods remains a challenge.
The classic problem of hypothetical bias is that people overestimate their
hypothetical willingness to pay for environmental goods (e.g. Bohm (1972);
Bishop and Heberlein (1986);Murphy et al. (2005);Ehmke et al. (2008)).
Jacquemet et al. (2013) propose using the social psychology theory of com-
mitment to create a social context of truth-telling, showing that making com-
mitments can induce people to keep their promises. They also argue that
commitment is stronger if it is made freely, is publicly expressed, and has con-
sequences for the subject. Jacquemet et al. (2013) asked one group of subjects
to take a written oath freely before a second-price auction. They found that
the oath-treatment group performed better than the hypothetical-treatment
group and the monetary-incentives treatment group in an induced value ex-
periment. They also found that the oath-treatment group bid higher than the
monetary-incentives treatment group and bid lower than the hypothetical-
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treatment group in a homegrown-value experiment (see also Jacquemet et al.
(2017)).
Social psychologists studying commitment theory find that people tend
to fulfil their commitments. Geller et al. (1989) found that safety belt use on
a university campus was substantially increased by offering faculty, staff, and
students buckle up pledge cards to sign and return. Wang and Katzev (1990)
found that when subjects were asked to sign a pledge card to recycle paper,
they recycled 47% more paper than before the treatment. Similar results are
also found in economics research. Studies focusing on pre-experiment com-
munication found that people can make credible promises in games (Ostrom
et al. (1992);Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004)).
This study uses a second-price auction to test if the solemn oath can elim-
inate the hypothetical bias in eliciting preferences for environmental goods.
We find that in the induced-value experiment, a solemn oath reduces the
hypothetical bias, but the oath treatment is not perfectly demand-revealing.
Real monetary incentives are perfectly demand-revealing both with and with-
out the oath. In the homegrown value experiment, the oath reduces the
hypothetical bias and helps correct the non-binding participation constraint
problem. However, the effect is smaller than that found by Jacquemet et al.
(2013).
Our paper contributes to the literature on oaths in environmental valua-
tion by testing it in a cultural context less frequently studied in the literature.
Economists are calling for more replication of experimental studies. Aarts
et al. (2015) replicates studies in psychology and finds that approximately
one-third to one-half of the original findings are also observed in replication
studies. Maniadis et al. (2014) argue that some independent replications can
greatly increase the chance the original study is true. Camerer et al. (2016)
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make similar efforts to replicate studies in economics and find that approxi-
mately two-thirds of experiments studied yield results similar to the originals.
The cornerstone of experimental science is replication (Fisher (1935)). Our
study tests the solemn oath proposed by Jacquemet et al. (2013) in China.
Some researchers have tested the effect of an oath script in other cultures
such as the Netherlands and Spain with success (de Magistris and Pascucci
(2014);Demagistris et al. (2013)). Chinese culture is different from European
cultures , which may create different results for our study. Chinese society is
more collective, while European societies are more individualistic (Kim and
Markus (1999)). The effects of taking a solemn oath individually may be dif-
ferent for Chinese subjects than they are for European subjects. Our study
differs from Carlsson et al. (2013), which uses a contingent valuation study
in both China and Sweden. They find that an oath script lowers Chinese
subjects’ willingness to pay for climate change mitigation, compared with a
hypothetical treatment. However, the effect of the oath is different for Chi-
nese and Swedes. Our study uses a controlled lab experiment with induced
value. This allows us to compare subjects’ bids under the oath with their
true preferences.
2 Experimental Design
This experiment follows Jacquemet et al. (2013) and uses a solemn oath as
a commitment device to see whether subjects bid sincerely in a second-price
auction. This is an ex-ante approach to correct both the hypothetical bias
in a hypothetical survey and the downward bias in a real economic commit-
ment auction. The experiment has two parts: an induced value auction and
a homegrown value auction. Each part has four treatments: (1) baseline-
4
hypothetical, (2) oath, (3) monetary incentives, and (4) monetary incentives
and oath . We recruit 72 student subjects, and each treatment has 18 subjects
which are randomly divided into two groups. We conducted the experiments
in March 2017 in the campus of Xian Jiaotong University, China. The ex-
perimental design and the main features of the experiments are summarized
in table 1.
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Table 1: Experiment Design
Treatment Experiment
type
Rounds Payment Description
Baseline-hypothetical
IV 9 fixed participation fee
no commitment and no monetary incentives
HG 5 fixed participation fee
Monetary incentives
IV 9 fixed participation
fee+accumulated earnings
real monetary incentives
HG 5 fixed participation
fee+earnings in the
random drawn round
Oath
IV 9 fixed participation fee
taking an oath
HG 5 fixed participation fee
Monetary incentives and oath
IV 9 fixed participation
fee+accumulated earnings
taking an oath and real monetary incentives
HG 5 fixed participation
fee+earnings in the
random drawn round
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3 Induced Value (IV) Auction
3.1 Design of the IV experiment
Each treatment consists of two sessions. Each session has 9 bidders partic-
ipating in 9 rounds. In all sessions, subjects are told that they will get a
participation fee of 30 RMB. An on-campus job in Xi’an is usually paid 8
RMB per hour. The currency used for the auction is Experimental Currency
Units (ECU), and 3 ECU=1 RMB. The induced value is the resale price.
The profit of the winner equals the induced value minus the market clearing
price.
In treatments with the oath, the experimenter asks each subject to vol-
untarily sign a solemn oath in a separate room before he or she participates
in the experiment. Among the 18 participants for both the oath-only treat-
ment and the oath-with-incentives treatment, all signed the oath except for
one. Since the experiment is anonymous, we cannot exclude the data from
our analysis. Figure 1 is a sample of the solemn oath. After subjects en-
ter the lab, they are asked to randomly choose tables and sign the consent
forms. The experimenter reads the instructions aloud, and all questions are
addressed before the experiment starts. Subjects’ earnings in the experiment
equal the fixed payment of 30 RMB plus the accumulated earnings in each
round in the monetary-incentives treatment.
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Figure 1: oath script
3.2 Results
Result 1: taking a solemn oath reduces the hypothetical bias.
Support: Figure 2 shows the total demand revelation, which is the ratio
of the revealed total demand and the induced total demand. The closer
the total demand revelation is to 1, the higher the total demand revelation.
The demand revelation for the baseline is 1.46. Subjects bid 46% higher
than their induced values on average, and there is a hypothetical bias. The
demand revelation for treatments with monetary incentives and monetary
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incentives with oaths are 0.96 and 1.03 respectively. Subjects’ bids are very
close to their induced values on average. In the oath treatment, the demand
revelation is 1.12. This evidence suggests that taking an oath can reduce the
hypothetical bias.
Figure 3 shows the demand revelation by induced value. We can see the
demand revelation increases with the induced value. This is because subjects
overbid under the induced value to increase their chances of winning. When
the induced value is 24, subjects in the oath treatment have better demand
revelation (160%) than the baseline-hypothetical treatment (271%). Again,
this suggests that taking an oath can mitigate hypothetical bias.
Result 2: The monetary-incentives treatment is perfectly demand-revealing.
Support: We use a random effect panel data model as follows to test the
demand revelation.
b∗it = βvit + α + φt + αi + ǫit (1)
where b∗it is subject i
′s bid in round t; vit is subject i’s induced value at
round t; α is the constant; φt is the fixed round effect; αi is the subject
random effect, which follows the normal distribution with a mean of zero
and a variance of δ2α. The estimation result is set forth in table 2.
We use the Wald test to study the demand revelation along the demand
curve: H0 : β = 1, α = 0, φt = 0, ∀t. The results reject the null hypothesis
that the baseline (p = 0.000), the oath treatment (p = 0.001), and the
treatment employing monetary incentives with oath (p = 0.021) are perfectly
demand-revealing. The results fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
monetary incentives are perfectly demand-revealing (p=0.283).
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Table 2: IV bidding behavior: Individual random effect model estimation
Parameter estimation
Baseline-
hypothetical
Monetary
incentives
Oath Monetary incen-
tives+oath
vit 0.691*** 0.994*** 0.797*** 0.928***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 31.80*** -4.03 21.34*** 4.66***
(0.001) (0.238) (0.000) (0.021)
Round Dummies YES YES YES YES
σµ 30.17*** 4.50*** 9.03*** 2.49***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σǫ 19.85*** 9.15*** 12.90*** 5.48***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-likelihood -741.69 -598.98 -659.35 -515.07
1) P values in parentheses
2) ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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4 Application: Homegrown valuation
4.1 Experiment design
In this experiment, subjects donate to a smog mitigation program initiated
by the China Environmental Protection Foundation (CEPF). CEPF, the first
non-profit organization in China dedicated to environmental protection, is an
NGO which has a special consultative status with the UN’s Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC). We auction a picture of Xi’an with a blue sky.
The market price of this picture is almost zero, so the good itself will not
affect the subjects’ donation.
Before the experiment, the experimenter introduces CEPF’s smog miti-
gation project. In this experiment, there are five auction rounds. Bids are
restricted to between 0 and 80 RMB. If a subject wins the auction and the
market price is larger than his or her experimental earnings, he or she must
pay the prize by using out-of-pocket money . Each subject completes a survey
about his or her socio-economic characteristics.
4.2 Results
Result 3: Taking an oath increases subjects’ bids relative to the monetary-
incentives treatment and reduces subjects’ bids relative to the baseline-hypothetical
treatment. We conclude that taking an oath can modestly correct both the hy-
pothetical bias and the non-binding budget constraint problem .
Support: In the homegrown valuation experiment, the subjects’ true prefer-
ences are unknown. We compare the number of zero bids and the number of
bids which are larger than the experimental earnings.
Figure 4 is the cumulative distribution function of bids in the four treat-
ments. We can see in the oath treatment, 22% of bids are lower than 40
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RMB. 100% of bids in the monetary incentives treatment and 7% of bids
in the baseline-hypothetical treatment are smaller than 40 RMB. The CDF
of the oath treatment first order dominates the baseline-hypothetical treat-
ment. The CDF of the monetary incentives treatment first order dominates
the oath treatment. From the data, we also find that taking an oath reduces
both the number of zero bids and the number of bids that are higher than
the experimental earnings.
Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we find that the oath-treatment bids
are significantly smaller than those of the baseline treatment (p=0.010), but
are significantly greater than the bids of the monetary-incentive treatment
(p=0.000). Taking an oath can reduce the hypothetical bias and underbid-
ding in the monetary-incentives treatment.
Result 4: Gender and pollution information affect bidding behaviour.
Support: We also collect individuals’ socio-economic characteristics to study
other factors that affect individuals’ bids. We include age, gender, knowl-
edge about CEPF, the level of knowledge about air quality index (AQI), and
exposure to media coverage about air pollution. Gender and knowledge of
CEPF are dummy variables. Our regression shows that females bid signifi-
cantly higher than males. More information about AQI and media coverage
of air pollution increases the subjects’ bids.
5 Conclusion
Our findings show that the solemn oath has a modest effect in correcting the
hypothetical bias in both the induced-value and the homegrown-valuation
experiments. It can also mitigate the non-binding participation constraint
problem. The effect of the oath in correcting biases in our study is not
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as pronounced as it is in Jacquemet et al. (2013). This may be due to
cultural differences. Western culture encourages individual expression and
Chinese culture encourages community harmony (Kim and Markus (1999)).
Individuals in China tend to conform more to social norms and bid more
closely to others . The oath has a modest effect in changing individual
behaviour in a competitive environment like the second-price auction.
Our study has a limited sample size, which may reduce the reliability
of our findings. In addition, we use student subjects, which are less repre-
sentative of the general population. We recommend future research and a
larger and more diversified sample size to test the effect of the solemn oath
in eliciting subjects’ sincere preferences.
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